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THE LOCK-IN EFFECT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
Kevin J. Lynch* 
Abstract 
Judges suffer from the same cognitive biases that afflict the rest of us. 
They use shortcuts to help them deal with the uncertainty and time pressure 
inherent in the judicial process. Judges should be aware of the conditions 
when those shortcuts lead to systemic biases in decision-making, and 
adjust legal standards to reduce or avoid such bias altogether. 
One important bias economists and psychologists have identified is the 
lock-in effect. The lock-in effect causes a decision maker who must revisit 
an earlier decision to be locked in to that earlier decision. The effect is 
particularly pronounced where the earlier decision led to the investment of 
resources that cannot be recovered. Although lock-in does not prevent the 
decision maker from altering course, it does introduce a systemic bias that 
should be taken into account. 
Preliminary injunctions create the conditions for judicial lock-in. 
Preliminary injunctions require judges to assess the merits of a case at an 
early stage and then revisit the merits later. In the early stages of a case, the 
facts or legal arguments may not be fully developed or the decision may be 
rushed, leading to a significant risk that the preliminary assessment of the 
merits will be incorrect. Where irreparable harm occurs as a result of the 
denial of a preliminary injunction, the judge will face strong motivation to 
validate his earlier assessment of the merits, even in the face of new 
evidence or upon further reflection. 
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently called into question the appropriate standard for 
deciding preliminary injunctions. In that case, the Court announced a broad 
statement of the standard without considering the variety of tests that lower 
courts have developed. As those courts reassess their test in light of the 
Winter decision, they should ensure that the preliminary injunction 
standard avoids the potential for lock-in. A flexible standard for issuing 
preliminary injunctions that employs a balancing test and requires plaintiffs 
to show only “serious questions” on the merits will achieve the purposes of 
a preliminary injunction while avoiding the risk of lock-in. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The evidence that humans are subject to numerous cognitive biases 
continues to mount.1 Judges suffer these biases just the same as everyone 
else.2 As it turns out, “smarter” people are even more subject to cognitive 
biases than the general population.3 This understanding has profound 
implications for our legal system, where most of the legal standards 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (summarizing 
developments in the field and presenting the numerous heuristics that can lead to biases in certain 
situations). 
 2. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829 (2001). 
 3. Richard F. West, Russell J. Meserve & Keith E. Stanovich, Cognitive Sophistication Does 
Not Attenuate the Bias Blind Spot, 103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 506 (2012). 
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employed by judges were developed long before these biases and their 
causes were understood. 
This Article focuses on one cognitive bias in particular, the “lock-in 
effect.”4 The lock-in effect describes how decision makers get trapped or 
locked into a particular course of action, due to their motivation to justify 
resources committed toward that course of action. Even when faced with 
information that an initial decision has not achieved the expected results, 
decision makers are biased towards continuing investment in that course of 
action. The lock-in effect thus introduces a systemic bias to sequential 
decision-making. 
Although lock-in might be expected to occur in numerous situations in 
the law, this Article focuses on preliminary injunctions. The U.S. Supreme 
Court recently called into question the appropriate standard for preliminary 
injunctions,5 leading lower courts to reexamine their standards for issuing 
preliminary injunctions.6 In deciding what the appropriate standard should 
be, courts should utilize our growing understanding of cognitive biases to 
ensure that the standard does not introduce any systemic bias into the legal 
system if it can be avoided. The conditions created when a judge denies a 
preliminary injunction for failure to show likely success on the merits can 
be expected to create lock-in because in that situation the judge explicitly 
decides to allow some irreparable harm to occur to the plaintiff. The same 
judge is later asked to reconsider whether the plaintiff was right all along. 
Because the judge will face internal and external pressures to justify the 
harm that was allowed to occur, the judge is less likely to reverse course on 
the merits later in the case. 
Fortunately, some federal courts have already developed and use a 
ready solution to this lock-in. The key lies in the “likelihood of success on 
the merits” prong of tests for issuing preliminary injunctions.7 To avoid 
lock-in, judges should employ a flexible standard for deciding preliminary 
injunctions that uses a sliding scale to weigh all of the preliminary 
injunction factors, and only requires a showing of “serious questions” to 
satisfy the merits factor. If a higher standard for success on the merits 
                                                                                                                     
 4. As discussed below, this or a similar effect might be referred to not just as lock-in, but 
also as escalation of commitment, entrapment, face-saving, self-justification, effort justification, or 
path dependence, to name a few. This Article refers to all of these as “lock-in” throughout, only 
using different terminology when the distinction is important. 
 5. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (stating the four 
general factors used to decide whether to grant preliminary injunctions without acknowledging the 
variety of ways lower courts evaluate and weigh those factors). 
 6. As discussed in Section II.B, infra, the test for issuing a preliminary injunction typically 
involves some variation on a four-factor test that calls on judges to evaluate (1) the likelihood of 
irreparable harm; (2) the likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the balance of harms; and (4) the 
public interest. 
 7. As discussed in Section II.B, infra, the standard that plaintiffs must meet for the 
“likelihood of success on the merits” prong varies across the circuits, with some requiring a “strong 
showing” and others only looking for “serious questions.” 
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creates a significant lock-in effect, as can be expected, then that standard 
should be changed. When a showing of irreparable harm has been made, a 
judge should only deny a motion for preliminary injunction if the moving 
party cannot demonstrate that there are serious questions going to the 
merits.8 
A brief example is helpful to illustrate how the lock-in effect occurs in 
practice. Suppose an environmental organization files suit in federal court 
to challenge a decision by the U.S. Forest Service to allow a timber sale in 
a National Forest. The merits of the case will turn on an issue such as the 
decision’s compliance with the approved management plan for that 
National Forest, or the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement 
prepared for the project. If the case raises a novel issue, it may be difficult 
for the environmental organization to show that it has a “strong likelihood” 
of success, particularly before the administrative record is released, or 
before the organization can engage expert witnesses to demonstrate why 
the court should consider an important issue. If the plaintiff cannot meet 
this high threshold, then a judge cannot issue a preliminary injunction in 
many federal circuits. However, if the Forest Service plans to proceed with 
the timber sale, then the trees will be cut down. 
Thus, the environmental organization can easily demonstrate irreparable 
harm9 and may feel compelled to seek a preliminary injunction.10 Yet once 
a judge denies a preliminary injunction and allows irreparable harm to 
occur, the lock-in effect makes the judge more likely to affirm the earlier 
finding on the merits to justify having allowed the harm to occur. The 
judge will face strong self-justification motivations to issue a consistent 
ruling that it was lawful for the trees to be cut down all along. Reversing 
course and finding in favor of the environmental organization is always 
possible, and will likely still occur in some cases; however, it will occur 
less frequently than it would have if the plaintiffs had never sought a 
preliminary injunction. This result occurs not because judges intentionally 
decide to provide cover for their erroneous earlier decisions or because 
                                                                                                                     
 8. For the purpose of simplicity, this hypothetical refers simply to the elements of irreparable 
harm and likelihood of success on the merits. However, as explained below, this Article also argues 
that the balance of harms and the public interest must also be demonstrated before a preliminary 
injunction should issue. 
 9. In this example, irreparable harm and success on the merits are largely independent. But 
that will not always be the case, as sometimes success on the merits and irreparable harm can be 
tightly linked, such as in cases involving trade secrets, for example. In those types of cases, where 
neither irreparable harm nor success on the merits can be shown to be likely, lock-in would not be 
expected to occur because the lack of irreparable harm reduces the incentives to justify the 
preliminary determination on the merits. 
 10. The environmental organization would not need to seek a preliminary injunction if the 
Forest Service agreed to hold off on the timber sale until after the lawsuit could be resolved. In this 
situation, the judge would not be asked to decide the merits under time pressure and without the 
benefits of full development of the factual record. Thus, no lock-in effect would occur. 
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judges fail to adequately deliberate; it occurs because of the lock-in effect. 
This Article argues that a uniform standard for preliminary injunctions 
should include the more flexible “serious questions” test for assessing the 
merits of the claim and should employ a sliding scale to balance the 
preliminary injunction factors. Part I of this Article introduces the lock-in 
effect by describing the developments in the economics and psychology 
literature that first identified the existence of this bias, addressing potential 
means for curing the bias, and providing an overview of the treatment of 
similar cognitive biases in the legal literature. Part II provides background 
on the current dispute over the proper standard for deciding preliminary 
injunctions in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Winter decision, 
distinguishes preliminary injunctions from other forms of preliminary or 
injunctive relief, and describes proposals for what the appropriate standard 
should be. Part III then connects lock-in to preliminary injunctions, 
showing how the unique context created when a judge denies a preliminary 
injunction based solely on failure to show likely success on the merits 
creates the same motivations in judges that have been found to cause lock-
in. Although further study is needed to prove that lock-in occurs in the 
context of preliminary injunctions, the strong potential for lock-in justifies 
uniform adoption of the flexible sliding-scale standard that requires only 
serious questions regarding the merits. Finally, Part IV responds to the 
most common objections to the argument made in this Article and the 
choice of solutions to prevent lock-in from biasing judicial decisions. 
I.  THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
A few definitional issues are important to resolve before analyzing the 
lock-in effect as it applies to judicial decision-making and the preliminary 
injunction standard. The choice of terminology is a difficult one. This 
Article uses “lock-in” because that term helps to capture the underlying 
dynamics that lead to a systemic bias in the judicial application of the 
preliminary injunction standard. Stated generally, this Article employs the 
term “lock-in” to describe a situation where a decision maker reaches an 
initial decision on an issue, which leads to some allocation of resources, 
and then revisits that decision later. The lock-in effect refers to the extent 
that the decision maker is less likely to change her decision, even in light 
of new information or after more time for reflection, than she would have 
been if she never were asked to make the initial decision. Lock-in occurs 
because of the tendency to want to justify the initial allocation of resources 
by confirming that the initial decision was correct. The most likely 
situation for lock-in to occur is when a change in the decision upon later 
review would imply that the earlier allocation of resources was not the best 
course of action.  
Of course the decision maker can and does change her mind some of 
the time, but this Article argues that the final distribution of her decisions 
5
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will be skewed because of her initial decision and allocation of resources. 
As argued in Part III, this concept applies to the preliminary injunction 
context, where a judge denies a preliminary injunction for failure to 
demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits, thus allowing a 
demonstrated irreparable harm to occur. Later, that judge is less likely to 
change the earlier decision on the merits because doing so would mean that 
the irreparable harm should not have occurred. 
The notion of the lock-in effect is derived from a variety of studies in 
the economics and psychology literature. Some of the concepts have been 
applied to legal issues before, and even to judicial decision-making. 
Therefore, the remainder of this Part presents the lock-in concept in more 
detail, evaluates potential cures for lock-in, and discusses the application of 
similar concepts to legal problems.  
A.  Evidence for and Causes of the Lock-In Effect 
Lock-in is an effect that may be caused by a number of cognitive 
processes.  Much of the discussion regarding what this Article calls lock-in 
originated in the literature on investment decisions,11 but the effect has also 
been studied in relation to hiring decisions,12 performance appraisal,13 
auctions,14 technology formats,15 and policy decisions.16 Some other names 
for the lock-in effect include escalating commitment, entrapment, or sunk 
costs. One of the primary causes of lock-in is self-justification, although 
other causes such as confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance contribute 
to the lock-in effect. 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a 
Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27, 27 (1976). 
 12. Brian C. Gunia, Niro Sivanathan & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Entrapment: Your Sunk 
Costs, My Escalation of Commitment, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1238, 1240–41 (2009). 
 13. Mark A. Davis & Philip Bobko, Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public 
Sector Decision Making, 37 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 121, 122 
(1986). 
 14. Gunia et al., supra note 12, at 1241–42. 
 15. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 205, 212 (1995). 
 16. Davis & Bobko, supra note 13, at 123–25; Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Commitment to a 
Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective, 23 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 40, 40 (1978). This effect has 
also been discussed in context with the Vietnam War, where President Kennedy initially committed 
16,000 troops but President Johnson, in spite of evidence that continued involvement in the war 
was unwise, increased the deployment of troops to over 500,000. Gunia et al., supra note 12, at 
1238. A more recent example is perhaps evident in the repeated attempts to repeal the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act that led to a damaging partial government shutdown, both for 
the country and for the politicians and groups pushing for the shutdown. See Jennifer Rubin, Ted 
Cruz Republicans Killing Ken Cuccinelli, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/10/15/ted-cruz-republicans-killing-ken-
cuccinelli (discussing, from a conservative perspective, how the public reaction to the government 
shutdown was impacting the Republican candidate for governor in Virginia). 
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Although precise formulations of the lock-in effect can vary, a few 
general principles stand out that are potentially useful in the context of 
judicial decision-making. Lock-in can occur when a decision maker has 
reason to honor or validate resources already invested (known as “sunk 
costs”) by allocating further resources towards a suboptimal course of 
action.17 The “reasons” why this lock-in occurs involve a desire, whether 
conscious or subconscious, to justify a past decision. This self-justification 
motivation could include both an internal component—a “desire to 
demonstrate rationality to himself or restore consistency between the 
consequences of his actions and a self-concept of rational decision 
making”—and an external component—an “attempt to demonstrate 
rationality to others or to prove to others that a costly error was really the 
correct decision over a longer term perspective.”18 Confirmation bias and 
cognitive dissonance are also important processes that lead to lock-in, and 
each are discussed in turn below. 
Professor Barry Staw first described the self-justification that can result 
when an individual’s behavior leads to negative consequences, identifying 
the problem as “escalating commitment” in the article Knee Deep in the 
Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action.19 This work pushed back on the intuitive and seemingly reasonable 
assumption that individuals would reverse decisions or change behaviors 
that lead to negative outcomes.20 Earlier work had shown that under certain 
circumstances, specifically those instances where a person’s own behavior 
leads to the negative consequences, self-justification processes would be 
employed by individuals to either rationalize their previous behavior or 
defend themselves (psychologically) against the adverse consequences.21 
Key aspects of this earlier work were (1) that the consequences were 
“irrevocable or at least not easily changed” and (2) that “the individual 
must feel personally responsible for the negative consequences of his 
behavior.”22  
Professor Staw built on this prior work by conducting a simulation to 
test self-justification in the context of investment decisions, where both the 
consequences of the investment decision and the level of personal 
responsibility could be manipulated as independent variables.23 The 
participants were undergraduate business students playing the role of a 
corporate executive making decisions about the allocation of research and 
                                                                                                                     
 17. Staw, supra note 11, at 41. 
 18. Id. at 41–42. 
 19. Id. at 27. 
 20. Id. at 27. 
 21. Id. (discussing the literature on “forced compliance”). 
 22. Id. at 28. 
 23. Id. at 30.  The investment decisions made by the subjects were reversible, because at the 
later decision point, the subject was allowed to allocate investment funds among the two divisions 
of the hypothetical corporation, independent of the initial investment decision. Id. at 31–32. 
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development funds.24 Initially the participants were asked to decide in 
which of two divisions of the hypothetical company to invest the funds. 
Later,the participants were again asked to invest in the same two divisions, 
but this time they could allocate funds in any way they wished, and were 
presented with financial data for the two divisions since the initial 
investment.25  
One half of the subjects were presented with “positive consequences,” 
meaning the division they chose for the initial investment improved while 
the unchosen one declined.26 The other half were presented with “negative 
consequences,” meaning that the division they initially chose to invest in 
declined while the other improved.27 The subjects were randomly assigned 
so that half of them made both investment decisions in sequence (high 
personal responsibility) while the other half made only the second 
investment decision after being presented all the financial information (low 
personal responsibility).28 The experiment measured the dependent 
variable of “the individual’s commitment to a previously chosen 
investment alternative.”29  
Professor Staw found that “individuals invested a substantially greater 
amount of resources when they were personally responsible for negative 
consequences.”30 Professor Staw attributed this finding to self-justification, 
which may come from two different sources: (1) a desire to demonstrate 
rationality to oneself; and (2) an attempt to demonstrate rationality to 
others or prove that a decision was correct over the longer term.31  
Professor Staw continued to develop this idea over the coming years. 
One study simulated the role of decision makers at the World Bank to test 
processing of information after failure and success and its effect on 
commitment to policy decisions.32 The paper developed a theoretical 
model incorporating a variety of psychological effects, including 
“reinforcement effects,” “expectancy effects,” “self-justification effects,” 
“reactance effects,” “learned helplessness effect,” and the “invulnerability 
effect.”33 Another study found that “the trapped administrator is one who is 
most likely to become committed to a policy position and remain inflexible 
to change in the face of negative consequences.”34 Professor Staw later 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 31–32. 
 26. Id. at 32. 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. Id. at 32–33. 
 29. Id. at 33. 
 30. Id. at 39. 
 31. See id. at 41–42. 
 32. Staw & Ross, supra note 16, at 40. 
 33. See id. at 41–45. 
 34. Frederick V. Fox & Barry M. Staw, The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity 
and Policy Resistance upon Commitment to a Course of Action, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 449, 449 (1979). 
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attempted to synthesize the work he and his colleagues conducted on the 
topic,35 highlighting the importance of factors such as (1) whether the 
cause of the negative consequences was external and unlikely to persist or 
internal and likely to persist;36 (2) evidence for internal and external 
sources of justification;37 and (3) the importance of “norms for 
consistency.”38  
Other researchers have approached this or similar issues from different 
angles. One study found support for face-saving as a contributor to an 
entrapment condition by comparing subjects that varied in their level of 
social anxiety and asking them to make investment decisions in front of 
small or large audiences.39 Another study found that, in the context of 
public-sector decision-making, the context of the decision and the manner 
in which feedback was framed affected outcomes, such that escalation of 
commitment was found not only in high-responsibility decision makers but 
also in low-responsibility decision makers under the right conditions.40 
Another study tested the differences between theories that would either 
replace or supplement self-justification as the primary cause of lock-in.41 
That study found that supplementary theories led to more complete 
explanations while replacement theories did not do a better job than self-
justification to explain the observed behavior.42 That study followed an 
                                                                                                                     
 35.  Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 577, 578–80 (1981). 
 36.  Id. at 580. External or exogenous causes for a setback were often deemed as less likely to 
persist, such as monsoon rains or equipment failures during the Vietnam War that were not 
sufficient to change policy makers’ minds about whether to continue the war effort. Id. Internal 
causes for a setback were more likely to change commitment to a course of action, because the 
problems were deemed to be central to the program and likely to persist. Id. 
 37.  Id. Internal causes for self-justification included protection of self-image, while external 
pressure to prove to others that an earlier decision was correct might be even stronger. Id.   
 38. Id. at 580–81. The norm for consistency is the expectation that consistency in action is to 
be preferred over switching from one form of action to another. Id. Political discussions in recent 
years regarding flip-flopping, alleged or actual, of prominent politicians from John Kerry to Mitt 
Romney demonstrate the pervasiveness of the norm for consistency. See Glenn Kessler, Mitt 
Romney: Flip-Flopper or Not?, WASH. POST BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/mitt-romney-flip-flopper-or-not/2011/11/ 
30/gIQAH6ubEO_blog.html; Bush Attacks Kerry’s Flip-Flops, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2004), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/sep/28/20040928-123834-6324r. 
 39. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Elaine Lang, Face-Saving and Entrapment, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCH. 68, 70–71, 78 (1981), available at http://www.gwern.net/docs/sunkcosts/1981-
brockner.pdf. 
 40. See Davis & Bobko, supra note 13, at 133–35, 137. 
 41.  Replacement theories “posit that other factors influence escalating commitment instead of 
the need to justify previous decisions.”  Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing 
Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 50 (1992). In contrast, 
supplementary theories “recognize that other factors influence escalating commitment in addition to 
the need to justify previous decisions.” Id. 
 42. See  id. at 42–43. The two replacement theories the study discussed were prospect theory 
and decision dilemma theory. Id. at 50–53. While prospect theory was rejected as a replacement of 
9
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earlier book that examined “entrapment situations” and pulled out several 
general characteristics of the phenomenon that depended on either the 
decision-making situation itself or the response of the decision maker to 
the situation.43  
Two other cognitive processes can lead to lock-in: confirmation bias 
and cognitive dissonance.  Confirmation bias involves a process whereby 
people “interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial 
beliefs.”44 Thus, people will seek out information that supports their initial 
position and overlook information that undermines it.45 Cognitive 
dissonance refers to the “psychological discomfort” that comes from 
inconsistency between “what a person knows or believes and what he 
does.”46 As a result of this discomfort, a person is motivated to try to 
reduce the dissonance or to “avoid situations and information which would 
likely increase the dissonance.”47 Cognitive dissonance has been advanced 
as a cause of both the sunk cost effect and the escalation of commitment,48 
which can both be seen as examples of lock-in. 
Another strand of research focused on the way that broader markets can 
experience lock-in as a result of path dependence, where initial decisions 
by economies and markets result in irremediable error.49 The idea behind 
path dependence is that initial conditions lead to a decision that is later 
difficult to change regardless of whether the decision was good in the long 
                                                                                                                     
self-justification, the author stated that prospect theory might explain escalation of commitment in 
some situations where self-justification does not fit as well, and thus prospect theory could work as 
a supplementary explanation. Id. at 53. It also discussed a number of other psychological, social, or 
structural issues that could complement self-justification, including whether an audience is 
observing the decision maker’s escalation, the presence of side bets related to the investment in 
question, group polarization, modeling, and self-presentation. Id. at 54–57. 
 43. JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING CONFLICTS: A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 4–5 (1985). The situational characteristics include whether the 
investment was irretrievable, whether the decision maker had any choice to change the situation, 
whether the goal to be achieved was uncertain, and whether repeated investments were required. Id. 
at 4. For the response characteristics in entrapment situations the decision maker faces increasing 
conflict as time progresses, increases in emotional involvement over time while rational reasons 
recede, and the entrapment is self-perpetuating (up to a certain point). Id. at 4–5. 
 44. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979); see also Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 594–603 (2013) 
(analyzing the confirmation bias’s effect on lawyers). 
 45. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and 
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 315, 316–
17 (2010). 
 46. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–2 (1957). 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Laura Hutzel, The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in 
the Sunk Cost Effect, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 295, 304 (2000). 
 49. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 15. 
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term.50 The particular focus of this literature is those situations where the 
initial decision was not optimal. More specifically, the literature focused 
on where the suboptimal initial decision can be changed; path dependence 
results in lock-in of the initial decision even though a different 
arrangement would be preferable.51 The research provides an example of 
the market’s choice of VHS as a videotaping format even though Betamax 
was commonly perceived to be superior.52  
Other work has assessed the physiological effects or personality traits 
that correlate with escalating behavior.53 For example, a polygraph was 
used to measure skin temperature, heart rate, and other physiological 
measures during an escalation scenario known as the “dollar auction 
game.”54 Skin temperature was generally correlated to the stage of the 
escalation scenario, but the strongest relationship was between heart rate 
and point of decision.55 Personality traits based on the Risk Taking Scale 
and the Machiavellian Test did not correlate with the size of the ultimate 
bid, although there were correlations with skin temperature, which 
indicates how relaxed the participant was at various stages of the 
experiment.56  
Other motivations and causes resulting in lock-in beyond these might 
be relevant,57 but this Article focuses on self-justification, confirmation 
bias, and cognitive dissonance, for reasons explained in Part III. 
B.  Potential Cures for Lock-In 
Because by definition lock-in includes commitment to a decision that 
later information reveals to be suboptimal, once lock-in is recognized, it is 
desirable to find a way to avoid or reduce its effects. The potential “cures” 
for lock-in might involve additional steps in the decision-making process 
that can reduce or eliminate the effect, or a change in the underlying 
conditions to avoid the potential for lock-in in the first place. This section 
discusses and evaluates some of the potential “cures” for lock-in as they 
apply to the preliminary injunction context. Specifically, these solutions 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Id. at 205–06. 
 51. Id. at 206–07. 
 52. Id. at 208. Perhaps a more current example, though one also fading into the past as well, 
is the dominance of Windows-based personal computers over Macs, even though Macs are widely 
perceived to be “better” or at least more stable and less susceptible to viruses. 
 53.  ALLAN I. TEGER, TOO MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT 61–82 (1980). 
 54. Id. at 61–62. The dollar auction game involves a group bidding on a dollar bill such that 
the highest bidder wins the dollar, but the second highest bidder must also pay his bid. Id. at 12. As 
a result, for both the highest and second-highest bidder, the most recent bid is an irretrievable 
investment, regardless of whether they win or lose the auction. Id. In this situation, the bidding will 
often exceed the value of the prize such that both the highest and the second-highest bidder lose 
overall. Id. at 13, 23–25.  
 55. Id. at 64–70. 
 56. Id. at 77–78. 
 57. Brockner, supra note 41, at 41. 
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include the introduction of a second decision maker, the use of devil’s 
advocacy, and other means for avoiding lock-in.  
Because of the strong self-justification motives inherent in the lock-in 
effect, many have advocated the seemingly elegant solution of introducing 
a second decision maker. The idea is that to the extent lock-in is caused by 
the desire of the decision maker to justify his initial decision, either to 
himself or to observers, the introduction of a second decision maker should 
remove the self-justification motivations driving lock-in.58 This simple and 
elegant solution should work and has been proposed by many of the 
leading researchers in the field.  
However, recent research indicates that merely introducing a second 
decision maker may be insufficient if there is not also psychological 
separation between the decision makers.59 “Even the subtlest of 
psychological connections” can undermine the ability of separate decision 
makers to cure the lock-in effect.60 “People feel connected to others when 
they share even subtle similarities like common group membership, similar 
names, and even the same birthday.”61 Such psychological connections 
have been shown to result in suffering “the exhaustion of others’ self-
control efforts” or feeling others’ cognitive dissonance as a result of the 
blurred self–other boundary.62  
This same psychological connectedness leads one decision maker to be 
locked in to the previous decision of another, as if it were his own 
decision.63 Experiments show that perspective-taking (imagining how the 
other decision maker felt and thought as he made his decision, or simply 
imagining a day in the other’s shoes) leads to vicarious lock-in in two well-
studied lock-in scenarios: investment in a failing business division, and 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Gunia et al., supra note 12, at 1238–39. 
 59. Id. at 1238. The “psychological” connections tested in this study included perspective-
taking, shared attributes (birthdays), and interdependent mindsets. Id. As discussed below, judges 
serving on the same court may be expected to have many comparable psychological connections. 
See infra text accompanying notes 61–63. 
 60. Id. at 1238. 
 61. Id. at 1239. See generally Herni Tajifel et al.,  Social Categorization and Intergroup 
Behavior, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PYSCHOL. 149 (1971) (studying the effects of social categorization on 
intergroup behavior); Brett W. Pelham, Mauricio Cravallo & John T. Jones, Implicit Egotism, 14 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., 106, 106 (2005) (explaining that people tend to gravitate 
towards other “people, places, and things that resemble the self”); Dale T. Miller, Julie S. Downs & 
Deborah A. Prentice, Minimal Conditions for the Creation of a Unit Relationship: The Social Bond 
Between Birthdaymates, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 475 (1998) (observing a similar phenomenon 
among individuals sharing birthdays). 
 62. Gunia et al., supra note 12, at 1239. See generally Joshua M. Ackerman et al., You Wear 
Me Out: The Vicarious Depletion of Self-Control, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 326 (2009); Michael I. Norton 
et al., Vicarious Dissonance: Attitude Change from the Inconsistency of Others, 85 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 47 (2003). 
 63. Gunia et al., supra note 12, at 1239. 
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review of a poorly performing employee.64 A further experiment has 
demonstrated vicarious lock-in due to shared birth dates, based on month 
and year.65 A final set of experiments has shown that people primed to be 
interdependent (assigned to write about completing a task by working with 
others, as opposed to writing about a task completed alone) also exhibited 
vicarious lock-in with the business investment scenario.66 These results 
should give pause to anyone suggesting that lock-in can be avoided in the 
preliminary injunction context simply by having one judge decide the 
preliminary injunction and another decide the case on the merits (or having 
the case go to a jury trial). However, this solution also cannot be dismissed 
out of hand. 
Devil’s advocacy has also been suggested in the literature as a potential 
cure for lock-in based on its supposed ability to help test assumptions in 
the initial decision.67 This research builds off the idea that expert reports 
that recommend a certain course of action can promote escalation of 
commitment toward that course of action.68 The study used the investment 
decision test employed by Professor Staw and found that escalating 
commitment could be promoted by an expert report recommending 
increased investment.69 The study also found that devil’s advocacy reduced 
the escalation, although the marginal significance of this finding compared 
to the strong increase in investment resulting from the reliance on an expert 
report meant that, overall, the presence of the expert increased escalation, 
even when devil’s advocacy was employed.70 Part IV discusses in greater 
detail the implications of this study for the adversarial system of deciding 
preliminary injunctions. 
Finally, the literature discusses a number of other methods for deterring 
lock-in.71 For example, setting limits can encourage the decision maker to 
envision the goals not being achieved in the short run.72 Other means for 
encouraging intentional behavior can prevent lock-in, such as “forewarning 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 1239–41. Perspective-taking makes people feel as if they are identified with or 
similar to another person whose perspective they take, thus increasing their psychological 
connectedness. 
 65. Id. at 1241–42. 
 66. Id. at 1242. Performance of this type of task promotes interdependence and creates a 
generalized sense of connectedness to others. 
 67. Charles R. Schwenk, Effects of Devil’s Advocacy on Escalating Commitment, 41 HUM. 
REL. 769, 769 (1988). 
 68. Id. at 773. 
 69. Id. at 771, 775–77, 779. 
 70. Id. at 775–80. 
 71. BROCKNER & RUBIN, supra note 43, at 211. 
 72. Id. at 197–203. When, at the outset of the decision-making process, an individual sets a 
limit beyond which she will not invest, it is easier for her to withdraw from the investment later 
upon reaching the limit, despite not achieving the goal. This is because the decision to withdraw 
honors a previous commitment (not to invest over the limit), reducing the cognitive dissonance 
associated with abandoning the investment. Id. at 197. 
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about entrapment, direct experience with entrapment, exposure to models, 
and salient information about the costs associated with persistence.”73 In 
addition to these “cognitive” means for avoiding lock-in, studies have 
identified a number of “motivational” drivers for avoiding lock-in. These 
include both negative motivations, such as anxiety over the conflict, as 
well as positive motivations, such as the desire for successful self-
presentation.74 
C.  The Lock-In Effect and Other Cognitive Biases in the  
Legal Literature 
The author of this Article has not identified any studies analyzing the 
lock-in effect on judicial decision-making.75 Despite this seemingly broad 
statement, legal scholarship has applied other cognitive biases directly to 
judicial decision-making and similar or related biases to address problems 
other than judicial decision-making. This section presents a brief overview 
of the variety of contexts where these cognitive biases have been applied. 
The cognitive biases of judges have received some scholarly attention. 
One important study tested a sample of 167 magistrate judges for five 
cognitive biases:  
anchoring (making estimates based on irrelevant starting 
points); framing (treating economically equivalent gains and 
losses differently); hindsight bias (perceiving past events to 
have been more predictable than they actually were); the 
representativeness heuristic (ignoring important background 
statistical information in favor of individuating information); 
and egocentric bias (overestimating one’s own abilities).76 
The study found evidence that each of these cognitive biases affected the 
magistrate judges.77 Or, as the study’s authors put it, “Judges, it seems, are 
human.”78 A similar study found evidence of cognitive bias affecting 
lawyers, resulting in protracted litigation due to biases based on intuition, 
the framing effect, the confirmation bias, nonsequentialist reasoning, and 
the sunk-cost fallacy.79 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 211. 
 74. Id. at 211–18. 
 75. This statement holds true for other terms for lock-in, such as entrapment or escalation of 
commitment. 
 76. Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 784. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 821 (citing Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 223 (1931)). 
 79. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 579–81 (2013). Confirmation bias and the sunk-cost fallacy are both closely 
related to what this Article describes as lock-in. For a discussion of confirmation bias, see supra 
notes 42–43 and accompanying text. The sunk-cost fallacy is described as a tendency “to continue 
an endeavor once an investment in money, time, or effort has been made.” Hal R. Arkes & 
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/5
2014] THE LOCK-IN EFFECT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 793 
 
It is not surprising that judges are susceptible to cognitive biases, given 
the multitude of studies finding the effects of cognitive bias among a wide 
variety of professionals, “including doctors, real estate appraisers, 
engineers, accountants, options traders, military leaders, and 
psychologists.”80 While these cognitive biases may play some role when 
judges rule on preliminary injunctions, they are conceptually distinct from 
the lock-in effect, which has its origins in self-justification and the 
irretrievable commitment of resources. 
Many other legal scholars have applied related cognitive biases to 
judicial decision-making. For example, the entire practice of stare decisis, 
which underlies the common law system, has been described as cognitive 
error, based on cascades, choice bias, the endowment effect, the framing 
effect, path dependence, sticky defaults, system justification theory, the 
motive to simplify, and the motive to cohere.81 The burden of proof in civil 
litigation has been analyzed in light of loss aversion and omission bias.82 
There do not appear to be any studies analyzing the lock-in effect 
among judges, yet there is no reason to believe that the lock-in effect 
would not influence judges.83 However, legal scholarship has analyzed the 
lock-in effect itself in other contexts, such as when Professor Clayton 
Gillette analyzed the lock-in effect as it relates to public institutions and 
their inability to appropriately adjust in a timely manner to changing 
conditions in society.84 Additionally, Professor Russell Korobkin has 
discussed the implications of the endowment effect on legal scholarship, 
though in the context of allocating legal entitlements and facilitating 
exchange of those entitlements and not the judicial decision-making 
                                                                                                                     
Catharine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
124, 124 (1985). The sunk-cost fallacy has similar motivational and cognitive causes to lock-in, 
such as avoiding cognitive dissonance, which adheres to the norm for consistency. Wistrich & 
Rachlinski, supra note 44, at 615. 
 80. Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 782–83. 
 81. Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 81–96 (2009). 
In its most basic form, stare decisis “requires adhering to a prior decision because it is the prior 
decision, not necessarily because it is correct.” Id. at 96. When stated that simply, stare decisis 
seems to be a clear instance of lock-in. Whether that type of lock-in is desirable is outside the scope 
of this Article. 
 82. Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof in 
Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (2012). 
 83. Whether judges are more or less susceptible to lock-in than others is not known without 
more detailed study. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the deliberative decision-making 
process followed by judges can overcome, in part, the lock-in effect. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (describing a 
model in which the deliberative process can sometimes, but not always, override initial decisions 
reached through intuitive processes); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive 
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004) (positing a model of judicial 
decision-making where judges take complex situations and reconstruct them into easier-to-
understand decisions). 
 84. Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 813 (1998). 
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process itself.85 Professor Charles Lawrence earlier applied the lessons of 
cognitive psychology to the issue of unconscious racial bias.86 
This discussion of the legal scholarship analyzing cognitive biases is 
not in any way intended to be comprehensive. However, this context helps 
to highlight the contribution of this Article, which takes one cognitive bias 
(the lock-in effect) and applies it to one particular instance of judicial 
decision-making (preliminary injunctions) to shed light on a potential 
systemic bias that leads to a prescription for avoiding that bias. 
II.  PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
Now that the lock-in effect has been described, this Part provides a brief 
background on preliminary injunctions in order to describe the situations 
under which lock-in can be expected to occur. A description of the 
preliminary injunction standards used in many jurisdictions reveals that 
judges are often asked to assess the merits of the case at an early stage, 
based on incomplete information or rushed decision-making. Proposed 
reforms of the preliminary injunction standard do not take into account the 
lock-in effect. Therefore, this Article proposes an improvement to the 
standard that is designed to reduce or remove the lock-in effect. 
A.  Different Types of Injunctive and Preliminary Relief 
An injunction is deemed “preliminary” when it is sought before 
resolution of the merits of a case. Therefore, a preliminary injunction is 
distinct from injunctions that may be issued later in the course of litigation, 
such as a permanent injunction (after success on the merits)87 or an 
injunction pending appeal (after failure on the merits but before an appeal 
is decided). Closely related to the preliminary injunction is the temporary 
restraining order, which differs from a preliminary injunction principally in 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1229 (2003) (describing the endowment effect as “undoubtedly the most significant single finding 
from behavioral economics for legal analysis to date”). The endowment effect is “the princip[le] 
that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not.” Id. at 1228 
(citing Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
39, 44 (1980)). 
 86.  Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987). 
 87. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction “must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved 
by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The 
precise formulation or level of showing required for each of these factors is not important. The key 
part of this test for the purposes of this Article is that a permanent injunction, because it comes after 
the merits have been decided, does not involve any assessment of the likelihood of success on the 
merits. 
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the duration of its effect and the urgency of its resolution.88 
Another related type of preliminary relief is a stay, which can take many 
different forms. One common stay is a stay of discovery pending resolution 
of a motion to dismiss.89 The Supreme Court recently distinguished 
between a stay and an injunction by noting that an injunction “is a means 
by which a court tells someone what to do or what not to do,” while a stay 
“operates upon the judicial proceeding itself” and not a particular actor.90 
However, the Court did note that “[a] stay pending appeal certainly has 
some functional overlap with an injunction, particularly a preliminary 
one.”91 Not only do both types of relief have a similar practical effect “of 
preventing some action before the legality of that action has been 
conclusively determined”92 but also there is “substantial overlap between 
[the stay factors] and the factors governing preliminary injunctions.”93 
Oftentimes the test for whether to grant a stay, such as a stay pending 
appeal or a discovery stay, includes consideration of the likelihood of 
success on the merits, one of the key prongs of the test for a preliminary 
injunction. 
The likelihood of success on the merits prong of the preliminary 
injunction test is critical to the argument that lock-in can be expected to 
occur. Although this Article focuses on the preliminary injunction 
standard, other standards that incorporate an initial look at the merits of the 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders (TRO) are governed by 
Rule 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. While a preliminary injunction cannot issue without notice, a TRO can. 
Id. 65(a)(1), (b)(1). The TRO must expire within fourteen days unless it is extended for good cause. 
Id. 65(b)(2). Both injunctions and TROs require the movant to give a security sufficient to pay costs 
or damages to a party later found to be wrongfully enjoined. Id. 65(c). However, courts have 
discretion in determining whether to require a security, and may choose only a nominal surety bond. 
See, e.g., RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009); Winnebago Tribe v. 
Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003). 
A further distinction between TROs and preliminary injunctions is that normally only a 
preliminary injunction is available for interlocutory appeal, although courts will focus more on the 
substance of the order rather than its title when deciding its appealability. See, e.g., Nordin v. 
Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 343 (8th Cir. 1990).  
Finally, TROs might be expected to exhibit less lock-in because the judge is primed to 
reconsider the decision more fully when the plaintiff seeks to extend a TRO into a preliminary 
injunction. However, TROs are typically sought because there is some urgent threat of irreparable 
harm, and so even in the short time after a TRO is denied, the irreparable harm may occur, thus 
creating self-justification, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance pressures. Further, as 
discussed infra Section IV.C, the granting of a TRO would not be expected to exhibit the same 
lock-in effect as the denial of a TRO, because of the requirement for showing not just success on the 
merits but also that irreparable harm, balance of harms, and the public interest support the issuance 
of a TRO. 
 89. Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay 
Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 76 (2012). 
 90. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757–58 (2009). 
 91. Id. at 1758. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1761. 
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underlying case might also be expected to exhibit lock-in. Thus, other areas 
in which lock-in might be observed could include discovery stays,94 
injunctions or stays pending appeal,95 and TROs.96 However, other types of 
injunctive relief, notably the permanent injunction, do not give rise to 
concerns about lock-in because they do not involve an initial weighing of 
the merits. While the purpose of a preliminary injunction is “merely to 
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can 
be held,” a permanent injunction is only issued once “the parties will 
already have had their trial on the merits.”97 Thus, because the court has 
already reached the decision on the merits before a permanent injunction is 
entered, there is no risk of lock-in. 
B.  Standards for Preliminary Injunctions 
When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, judges 
typically assess some variation of the following four factors: (1) whether 
irreparable harm is likely to occur if the injunction is not granted; (2) the 
likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the balance of harms between 
parties to the litigation if an injunction is issued or if one is not; and (4) the 
public interest. Courts evaluate these factors differently.98 Some courts 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See, e.g., Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652–53 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (the court will take 
a “preliminary peek” at the merits to decide whether to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss). 
 95. Courts may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, pending appeal of an 
interlocutory or final order that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c). In 
Winter itself, the Ninth Circuit granted the Navy a stay of the injunction that had been entered by 
the district court. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863–65 (9th Cir. 2007), 
rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). The standard that appellate courts use to stay civil judgments pending 
appeal includes “a strong showing that [the movant] is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id. at 863 
(quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). For the purposes of this Article, there is 
no need to distinguish between a stay of an injunction pending appeal and a request for an 
injunction pending appeal, although the Supreme Court might make such a distinction in narrow 
circumstances. See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757–60. 
 96. TROs are decided using the same factors as preliminary injunctions, including the factor 
regarding likelihood of success on the merits. McLeodUSA Telecomm. Serv., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 
361 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Iowa 2005). 
 97. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1981). 
 98. The seminal work in this field was done by Professor Leubsdorf, where he identified the 
variety of formulations courts use to decide preliminary injunctions and proposed a coherent 
rationale to understand this variety. See generally John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978) (analyzing the factors the courts consider for issuing a 
preliminary injunction). 
Additionally, the public interest prong in particular is notoriously difficult to rationalize and 
predict. One court has described the public interest prong as the “wild card” of the preliminary 
injunction analysis. Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986).  
Scholars have described the public interest prong as “make weight” for supporting a decision 
primarily based on other prongs, Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 
7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173, 234 (1984), or as a factor that “may disguise and superficially 
legitimate a judge’s or party’s personal agenda,” Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New 
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treat some factors as threshold factors while some courts treat all four 
factors as independent requirements.99 Other courts adopt some variation 
of a sliding-scale approach—the standard for one or more factors may be 
reduced based on a particularly strong showing on other factors.100  
This Article focuses on the “likelihood of success on the merits” factor. 
As Part III discusses, this is the principal factor that creates the conditions 
where lock-in can occur. Despite some language seemingly to the contrary 
in recent Supreme Court opinions, lower federal courts have adopted a 
variety of standards for assessing the likelihood of success on the merits. 
Some courts state that a plaintiff must show that he is “likely to succeed on 
the merits,”101 while others state that the court will weigh the “likelihood 
of success on the merits.”102 “Likely to succeed on the merits” seems to 
imply that the plaintiff must show that success is more likely than not, 
although courts are not always explicit if that is the case. “Likelihood of 
success on the merits,” in contrast, seems to leave open whether the 
plaintiff must prove a 51% chance of success, or some greater or lesser 
chance of success. Additionally, the phrase “substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits”103 is also not clear—does “substantial” mean 5%? 
25%? 50%? 75%? Some courts provide more clarity and seem to require 
greater than a 51% chance of success, by stating that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate a “strong likelihood of success.”104 Other courts indicate that a 
less than 50% chance of success is sufficient, allowing an injunction to 
issue upon a showing of “serious questions” as to the merits of the case.105 
The array of different formulations used by courts, even within the same 
jurisdiction, has led to some confusion about what precisely plaintiffs must 
show. 
Furthermore, to the extent that preliminary injunction standards require 
                                                                                                                     
Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 864 (1989). See generally Orin H. 
Lewis, Note, “The Wild Card That Is the Public Interest”: Putting a New Face on the Fourth 
Preliminary Injunction Factor, 72 TEX. L. REV. 849 (1994). 
 99. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on 
other grounds by 559 U.S. 1089 (2010). 
 100. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 
2011); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 
35 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 582 F.3d 721, 725 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
 101. See, e.g., Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 
(1st Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. used this 
formulation. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 102. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 103. See, e.g., ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th 
Cir. 2009).  
 104. Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1134–35. Other formulations include whether there are “questions 
going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues ripe for 
litigation and deserving of more deliberative investigation.” RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 
1203, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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a showing that the plaintiff is more likely than not to succeed on the merits, 
no court has adequately explained how such a standard is any different than 
the ultimate burden of proof carried by the plaintiff when the merits are 
decided. In civil cases, the plaintiff wins by demonstrating a greater than 
50% chance that his claims should prevail. Although the Supreme Court 
has cautioned that “[a] party thus is not required to prove his case in full at 
a preliminary-injunction hearing,”106 this language seems inconsistent with 
the Court’s other statements that plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction 
“must normally demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of 
their challenge.”107 Furthermore, Rule 65(a)(2) explicitly provides a 
procedure for consolidating a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on 
the merits.108 Thus a standard for likelihood of success on the merits that is 
equivalent to the party’s burden of proof at trial is not just bad policy, it is 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.109  
The Supreme Court recently examined the preliminary injunction 
standard in a series of cases, most notably the Winter decision from 2008. 
In Winter, the Court stated the four traditional factors for a preliminary 
injunction as if they were each individual requirements to be met, and also 
stated that a showing of a “possibility” of irreparable harm is 
insufficient.110 However, the resolution of the case rested on neither the 
irreparable harm nor the likelihood of success on the merits prongs; 
instead, the Court based its holding on the failure of the plaintiff to 
establish that the balance of harms between the parties and the public 
interest favored a preliminary (or permanent) injunction.111 Thus the 
Supreme Court, apparently without fully considering the consequences of 
its sweeping and unnecessary language,112 has led the lower courts to 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
 107. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 (2012). 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2). 
 109. See Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395 (noting that courts normally require clear and 
unambiguous notice of the intent to combine a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the 
merits in order to afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases); see also 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 34–35 
(2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the interpretation that Winter and related cases “require[] a preliminary 
injunction movant to demonstrate that it is more likely than not to succeed on its underlying claims, 
or in other words, that a movant must show a greater than fifty percent probability of success on the 
merits”). 
 110. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008). 
 111. Id. at 378. 
 112. The reasons why the Supreme Court either intentionally or unintentionally chooses to 
make sweeping and inaccurate statements about procedural issues are puzzling. Perhaps Winter and 
similar cases are examples of “bad cases mak[ing] bad law.” See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1953 (2009) (redefining pleading standards in response to “national security” concerns raised 
in a suit challenging action by the Attorney General and other government official tasked with 
responding to the threats of terrorism). Winter and Iqbal involved the Supreme Court overturning 
lower courts that had taken a more careful and balanced approach in cases that pitted national 
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reexamine long-established preliminary injunction standards. The Fourth 
Circuit has even changed its preliminary injunction test because it viewed 
the Supreme Court as having “articulated clearly what must be shown to 
obtain a preliminary injunction.”113 
Despite the broad statements in the decision, the variety of different 
formulations of the preliminary injunction standard has survived in the 
lower courts even after the Winter decision.114 Although the Fourth Circuit 
felt compelled to follow the sweeping statements in Winter, the Second,115 
Seventh,116 Ninth,117 Tenth,118 and D.C.119 Circuits have expressly retained 
their balancing tests. 
In light of the variety of standards for preliminary injunctions that lower 
courts apply, and the seemingly inconsistent view of the Supreme Court 
that there is only one standard, a number of questions come to mind. What 
should the standard for preliminary injunctions be? Should there be a 
uniform standard across all federal courts? Should each factor of the 
standard be a separate requirement, or can some balancing occur? What is 
                                                                                                                     
security concerns against environmental values and civil rights, respectively. The dissenting opinion 
in Winter by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is the only portion of the decision that addresses 
explicitly the “sliding-scale” approach and the need to preserve the flexibility that “is a hallmark of 
equity jurisdiction.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 at 391–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). What the majority 
in Winter thought about the sliding-scale approach can only be inferred based on the broad and 
sweeping language regarding the appropriate standard for preliminary injunctions, and the dicta 
regarding the showing required for the irreparable harm prong. Id. at 375, 378. 
 113. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on 
other grounds by 559 U.S. 1089 (2010). 
 114. See Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011) (examining the split amongst the 
circuit courts in using the four factor test and the degree to which they use a sliding scale and 
require a showing of likelihood of success on the merits); see also Sarah J. Morath, A Mild Winter: 
The Status of Environmental Preliminary Injunctions, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, (2013). 
 115. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the standard applied by the circuit “[f]or the last five 
decades” and noting the benefits of the “serious questions” formulation). 
 116. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 
725 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter for the proposition that “[t]here also must be a plausible claim on 
the merits”). The strength of the merits required depends on the balance of harms. Id.  
 117. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the Winter Court did not explicitly discuss the “sliding-scale” approach). 
 118. See RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming 
that in certain cases the “movant need only show ‘questions going to the merits so serious, 
substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues ripe for litigation and deserving of more 
deliberative investigation’” (quoting Walmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 
1995))). The Tenth Circuit actually cited Winter but reframed the first prong of the test to be “a 
likelihood of success on the merits” as opposed to “he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Compare 
id. at 1208, with Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). 
 119. See Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(reaffirming the sliding-scale approach and noting that Winter “does not squarely discuss whether 
the four factors are to be balanced on a sliding scale”). 
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the showing required to demonstrate a likelihood of success (in all its 
various formulations)? The following section presents a few of the 
problems with existing standards, then describes the various proposed 
solutions from scholars and judges.  
C.  Problems with Preliminary Injunctions 
Requiring a showing of likelihood of success on the merits is 
problematic because it asks for an estimation of the ultimate outcome of 
the case before the case has been fully developed, and it is often on a 
compressed timeframe not conducive to deliberative decision-making. 
Plaintiffs often seek preliminary injunctions before discovery can be 
completed or even commenced, meaning that plaintiffs may not have the 
proof to show they can win, even where such proof exists. In challenges to 
federal agency action, plaintiffs may seek preliminary injunctions before 
the government has prepared an administrative record, making it difficult 
to show likelihood of success based on establishing that the record is 
inadequate or that the challenged action was arbitrary. Finally, unlike other 
rulings that occur before trial, such as motions to dismiss or summary 
judgment, no rules regarding burdens of proof or inferences protect against 
the imbalances of information that may exist between plaintiffs and 
defendants.120 
Preliminary injunctions also can force parties to argue the merits before 
they have fully developed them. The time pressures on judges, who might 
be asked to act before some action is taken by the defendants, means that 
the issues may not be researched thoroughly or sufficiently deliberated 
upon. The Supreme Court recognized this reality when it stated “[t]he 
choice for a reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly or 
participation in what may be an ‘idle ceremony.’”121 The Court further 
noted that “haste . . . is often necessary” when deciding a preliminary 
injunction. As a result, they are often decided “on the basis of procedures 
that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the 
merits.”122 Despite these difficulties with weighing the merits at the 
preliminary injunction stage, the Supreme Court nevertheless asserted that 
                                                                                                                     
 120. For example, in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only show that a claim is plausible, 
not that it is certain to prevail. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). On 
summary judgment, any disputed facts preclude resolution, and all inferences are drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). In 
contrast, in the preliminary injunction context, the plaintiff seeking the injunction has the burden to 
show likelihood of success on the merits even though an informational imbalance may favor the 
defendant. Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 at 374. 
 121. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009) (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. 
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1941)). Although the Nken Court was discussing a stay pending appeal, the 
same logic would apply to a preliminary injunction, where the ability to grant interim relief is 
supposed to allow sufficient time for the merits to be decided. 
 122. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
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a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy”123 that can only issue 
after a showing that the plaintiff “is likely to succeed on the merits.”124  
Federal courts that apply a “sliding scale” approach have discussed 
many of the problems that arise from application of a too rigid standard for 
preliminary injunctions. The Second Circuit has defended the value of its 
own “sliding scale” standard on the basis that it “permits a district court to 
grant a preliminary injunction in situations where it cannot determine with 
certainty that the moving party is more likely than not to prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits 
of not granting the injunction.”125 The source of the “value” of this 
approach is “its flexibility in the face of varying factual scenarios and the 
greater uncertainties inherent at the outset of particularly complex 
litigation.”126 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also noted in her Winter dissent 
that “[f]lexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction” and that this 
flexibility is consistent with the “sliding scale” approach to preliminary 
injunctions.127 Abandoning this flexibility would limit the value of 
preliminary injunctions:  
Preliminary injunctions should not be mechanically confined 
to cases that are simple or easy. Requiring in every case a 
showing that ultimate success on the merits is more likely 
than not “is unacceptable as a general rule. The very purpose 
of an injunction . . . is to give temporary relief based on a 
preliminary estimate of the strength of plaintiff’s suit, prior to 
the resolution at trial of the factual disputes and difficulties 
presented by the case. Limiting the preliminary injunction to 
cases that do not present significant difficulties would deprive 
the remedy of much of its utility.”128 
The problem with an overly rigid preliminary injunction standard is that 
all the reasons supporting why a preliminary injunction is necessary—to 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never 
awarded as of right.”). 
 124. Id. at 374. This statement was not necessary to the holding, which was based on 
consideration of the balance of the equities and the public interest. Id. at 378. The Court expressly 
did not decide whether the plaintiff had established a likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 378–
79. Even though the success of the merits prong was expressly identified as outside the scope of the 
Winter decision, a later Supreme Court decision has pointed to Winter for the proposition that 
“[p]laintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction of a statute must normally demonstrate that they are 
likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to that law.” Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 
(2012). 
 125. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 
30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 391–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 128. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 
30, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (2d ed. 2009)). 
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prevent “justice on the fly” and to preserve the status quo until the legal 
disputes can be fully litigated—apply not just in those cases where it is 
possible to demonstrate likely success on the merits, but also in any case 
that ultimately does succeed on the merits. Furthermore, if forcing an early 
decision based on the likelihood of success on the merits contributes to 
lock-in, then an inappropriately high standard for success on the merits can 
bias the outcome of cases in which plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctions. 
D.  Proposed Standards from Scholars 
Scholars and other commentators have proposed several distinct 
solutions to address the variety of uncertain and indeterminate standards 
lower federal courts use to decide preliminary injunctions. None of these 
solutions has examined the lock-in effect or other cognitive biases, which 
this Article contends should help shed light on which of these solutions, or 
another solution entirely, should be adopted in the federal courts. 
Professor John Leubsdorf published the seminal scholarly work on 
preliminary injunctions in 1978.129 After explicating the history and 
development of the preliminary injunction standard, Professor Leubsdorf 
argued that “[s]ince preliminary injunctions issue on the basis of 
rudimentary hearings, the preliminary injunction standard should aim to 
minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident 
to hasty decision.”130 Leubsdorf identified the “danger of incorrect 
preliminary assessment” as “the key to the analysis.”131 Recognizing that 
irreparable harm is possible on both sides, Leubsdorf suggested two 
inquiries: 
First, [the court] should appraise the likelihood that various 
views of the facts and the law will prevail at trial. Second, the 
court should assess the probable loss of rights to each party if 
it acts on a view of the merits that proves to be erroneous. The 
court can then chart the course likely to inflict the smallest 
probable irreparable loss of rights.132 
This formulation is similar to the balancing tests or sliding-scale 
approach employed by many of the circuits, and it appears to conflict with 
a hard reading of Winter that would require a showing of likely success on 
the merits regardless of the magnitude and certainty of irreparable harm. 
This Article shares Professor Leubsdorf’s assessment that a key issue is the 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Leubsdorf, supra note 98, at 525–66. Other scholars have labeled this the “Leubsdorf-
Posner” formulation because Judge Posner later adopted it in one of his cases. See Richard R.W. 
Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary 
Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 390–91 (2005). 
 130. Leubsdorf, supra note 98, at 540–41. 
 131. Id. at 541. 
 132. Id. 
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uncertainty inherent in early assessments of the merits, although it comes at 
this view from a different approach informed by a modern understanding 
of cognitive biases. 
A more recent scholarly look at preliminary injunction standards points 
out that “in the presence of legal uncertainty, a key (but largely 
unappreciated) function of preliminary injunctions is to promote 
efficiency.”133 According to this law-and-economics view, “it is 
unimportant whether the injunction is issued so long as adequate 
compensation is provided ex post.”134 This solution would transform the 
adequacy of surety from “an independent reason not to issue a preliminary 
injunction” to a sufficient basis to issue the injunction, regardless of any 
assessment of the merits or of irreparable harm.135 This solution holds 
some appeal, as it could completely eliminate the risk of lock-in based on 
inaccurate preliminary assessments of the merits. However, along with 
Professor Leubsdorf,136 this Article contends that the merits do have a 
valuable role to play and that judges can assess them without creating an 
unacceptable risk of lock-in. Furthermore, litigation often involves parties 
that have great disparities in wealth and so the party seeking an injunction 
may not be able to afford to post a bond, and preliminary injunctions 
should not be categorically denied on that basis. 
A final category of solutions calls for a uniform standard. U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow has argued that the lack of a uniform 
standard for preliminary injunctions has led to inconsistent judgments and 
inequitable decisions.137 More recently, an excellent student Note 
examined the impact that the Winter decision has had among the circuits 
and called for greater uniformity based on jurisdictions applying a variation 
of the sliding-scale approach.138 This Article joins those calling for greater 
uniformity in preliminary injunction standards, and, as Part III explains in 
more detail, it contends that some form of the sliding-scale approach can 
best achieve the goals behind granting preliminary injunctive relief. 
III.  THE LOCK-IN EFFECT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 
This Part connects the theory of lock-in to preliminary injunctions. This 
unique set of circumstances, occurring when a judge denies a preliminary 
injunction based solely on failure to show likely success on the merits, 
creates a lock-in effect in judicial decisions. The “success on the merits” 
standard required for preliminary injunctions is the main reason why 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 129, at 387. 
 134. Id. at 393. 
 135. Id. 
 136. John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
33, 43 (2007). 
 137. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal 
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 530–33 (2003). 
 138. Bates, supra note 114, at 1523.  
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judicial lock-in occurs. This Article proposes that incorporating a more 
flexible standard, one requiring only “serious questions” on the merits to 
grant a preliminary injunction, will still appropriately limit issuance of the 
injunctions while avoiding the risk of lock-in by failing to preserve the 
status quo. 
A.  Does Lock-In Occur? 
Preliminary injunction proceedings create the conditions where lock-in 
can be expected to occur. Judges asked to decide a preliminary injunction 
must make some assessment of the movant’s likelihood of success on the 
merits, regardless of the precise standard applied. This assessment is often 
made early in the case before full development of all the facts and often 
under significant time pressure. In addition to assessing the merits, the 
judge must look to whether irreparable harm will occur, whether the 
balance of hardships favors an injunction, and where the public interest 
lies.139 If these three factors are all met, but a preliminary injunction is 
nevertheless denied for failure to show likely success on the merits, then 
irreparable harm will likely occur, outweighing any harm that would have 
resulted from a preliminary injunction. Under those circumstances, the 
irreparable harm that follows the denial of a preliminary injunction 
represents the irretrievable commitment of resources that leads to lock-in, 
and the second look at the merits by the judge creates conditions where 
strong internal and external self-justification motives can be expected to 
influence the outcome of the case on the merits. Although judges certainly 
can and have changed their minds on the merits after denying a preliminary 
injunction, the lock-in effect can be expected to systematically bias 
outcomes so that cases in which a preliminary injunction was denied will 
be less likely to succeed on the merits as compared to situations where no 
preliminary injunction was sought.140 
When deciding a preliminary injunction, the judge may face significant 
pressure to rule quickly to preserve legal rights that might otherwise be 
lost. Unless the defendant agrees to hold off on taking any offending action 
until the legal claims can be resolved, the judge might have to issue an 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See supra Section II.B (discussing the four factors weighed in granting or denying a 
preliminary judgment). 
 140. This statement is stronger than one that simply says cases where  preliminary injunctions 
are denied are more likely to lose on the merits than cases where preliminary injunctions are 
granted. Certainly some, if not most, of the difference in those cases would be due to differences in 
the strength of the underlying claims—those cases that are stronger are more likely to have a 
preliminary injunction granted in the first place. Rather, the claim here is that when a preliminary 
injunction is denied based on a failure to show likely success on the merits, there exists some level 
of uncertainty about the underlying merits. Some of the cases where an injunction is denied should 
later be successful on the merits. But because the judge has said the merits were not strong enough 
at the initial stage, and then allowed some irreparable harm to occur, there will be pressure on the 
judge to justify the initial decision. 
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injunction quickly to prohibit behavior that the defendant would otherwise 
be permitted to carry out. The briefs presented by the parties in this 
situation may not be as helpful to the judge because of the rush in 
preparing them. In easy cases a judge may not need time to reflect on the 
arguments or to conduct independent research into the law, but in more 
difficult cases this may not be possible.  
The judge may hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction (although a 
hearing is not required) at which evidence would ordinarily be offered to 
the court. At this stage, the evidentiary rules and procedures normally in 
place at a trial are often not present. Furthermore, at this stage of the 
litigation, the facts of the case often have not been fully developed. This 
would most often be the case when the parties have not yet completed or 
even commenced discovery. Where there is a significant disparity of 
information between the parties, the movant may be at a significant 
disadvantage in terms of having to prove his case without the benefits of 
discovery. In administrative law cases challenging agency action, the 
record on which the court is to base its review may not have been produced 
yet, making a searching and thorough review of a record nearly impossible. 
The cases where one would expect to find the greatest lock-in effect are 
those where (1) irreparable harm was demonstrated; (2) the balance of 
harms tipped in favor of the plaintiff, perhaps strongly; (3) the public 
interest favored an injunction; but (4) plaintiff was not able to demonstrate 
a high enough likelihood of success on the merits, even though he 
demonstrated some likelihood. In these cases, a preliminary injunction 
would be denied.141 That would be enough to end some cases, but in many, 
the plaintiff might still proceed to seek a decision on the merits to prevent 
additional irreparable harm and to obtain whatever relief is still available.  
At times, the likely irreparable harm demonstrated by the plaintiff may 
in fact occur. If the balance of harms weighed strongly in the plaintiff’s 
favor, then this actual harm would far outweigh any harm that an 
injunction might have caused the defendant. This would still be the result 
the judge expected, who affirmatively choose not to intervene in spite of 
this actual harm, believing that the case would not succeed on the merits. 
The judge is then eventually asked to decide a summary judgment motion 
(if there are no disputed material facts) or preside over a trial to decide the 
merits of the case. While a jury might serve as the fact finder (unless it is a 
bench trial), the judge will still decide evidentiary disputes and determine 
                                                                                                                     
 141. One might also expect to find a lock-in effect where a preliminary injunction was granted, 
such that a judge would be more likely to find in favor of plaintiff once a preliminary injunction had 
issued. However, I believe this presents a much less serious concern because the judge would have 
determined that the balance of harms favored the injunction, as well as the public interest. Thus the 
standard already acknowledges the risk of error when granting a preliminary injunction, but 
provides a means for assessing which risk is greater. Furthermore, plaintiffs are often required to 
post a bond covering any damages to the defendant as a result of a preliminary injunction, which 
would also reduce the risk of lock-in effect when an injunction is granted. 
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whether the facts are sufficient to prove the legal claim alleged. 
 In this situation, a judge’s easiest option is to conform to the earlier 
ruling and dismiss the case on the merits. The judge is under significant 
pressure to justify the earlier decision that allowed the irreparable harm to 
occur. This might be justified by new evidence that was introduced on the 
merits or new arguments that were more developed, resolving some of the 
cognitive dissonance that would occur if a judge were to effectively reverse 
the earlier assessment of the merits that allowed the irreparable harm to 
occur. However, the lock-in effect places judges under pressure to interpret 
new evidence or apply new legal arguments in a way that would justify the 
denial of the preliminary injunction by affirming the earlier assessment of 
the merits, particularly where confirmation bias is the underlying process 
leading to lock-in. 
In an ideal world, the judge would evaluate the evidence and the legal 
arguments, ignore the prior denial of a preliminary injunction, and decide 
the case. But according to lock-in theory, a judge might be less likely to 
ultimately find for a plaintiff after allowing some irreparable harm to 
occur. Additionally, confirmation bias would likely arise in this situation 
because the judge will have a tendency to seek out evidence supporting the 
earlier decision on the merits and discounting or failing to give sufficient 
weight to any contradictory evidence. This effect should be greater the 
larger the harm that occurred. This is not to say that a judge would 
consciously dismiss a claim considered meritorious solely to justify the 
denial of the preliminary injunction. But a judge might be more skeptical 
of the evidence that supports a plaintiff’s claim, or prone to a more narrow 
reading of the law, in a way that systematically would disfavor plaintiffs 
who failed to secure a preliminary injunction. 
Lock-in theory does not mean that judges will never reverse themselves 
after denying a preliminary injunction. It does not mean that judges will 
consciously dismiss claims in order to save face, justify their earlier 
decisions, or protect their reputations among themselves or outsiders. 
However, the unconscious results of the lock-in effect still matter for 
plaintiffs. As a result of the lock-in effect, a plaintiff may reduce his 
chances of success on the merits when he seeks a preliminary injunction, 
but fails to demonstrate a sufficiently high likelihood of success. 
An example is helpful to understand how this might play out. Let us 
return to the example of a challenge to a timber sale as discussed in the 
Introduction. On the merits, the plaintiff must show that the U.S. Forest 
Service acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner in approving the timber 
sale. Irreparable harm is easily demonstrated in this case because once the 
trees are cut down the forest cannot be returned to its pre-harvest state. The 
balance of harms and public interest prongs also should not pose a great 
challenge for the environmental organization, absent some unique and 
compelling circumstances that require the trees to be cut down 
immediately.  
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Thus, the issuance of a preliminary injunction will hinge on whether the 
plaintiff can meet the standard for likelihood of success on the merits. If 
the government does not agree to prevent the sale and subsequent harvest 
of the timber, the plaintiff may be forced to seek a preliminary injunction 
before the government files its administrative record. In this situation, the 
key evidence necessary to prove the decision was arbitrary and capricious 
may not be available for the reviewing court to consider. Suppose there is a 
“smoking gun” email indicating that the government knew of a serious 
legal defect but deliberately swept it under the rug. Or suppose it would 
only be apparent upon a review of the record that the government had not 
conducted all of the studies needed to show that the forest would 
regenerate sufficiently quickly after the timber harvest. In these cases, the 
preliminary injunction would be denied and the trees would then be cut 
down before the merits could be decided. 
When the judge is later confronted with the full record and asked to 
decide the merits of the case, how will she respond if new evidence 
supports the plaintiff’s claims? In an ideal world, the judge will not suffer 
from the cognitive biases that affect everyone else, such as confirmation 
bias, but instead will evaluate the new evidence and decide that the 
plaintiff should succeed on the merits. However, we do not live in such an 
ideal world.142 Judges are people too, and they suffer the same cognitive 
biases that the rest of us suffer. Because of the conditions for lock-in 
created by the preliminary injunction, the judge will face pressure to justify 
the denial of the injunction to herself and to her peers, the parties, and the 
public. 
Another way to look at the lock-in effect is to abstract away all the 
details of the case, and just look at some hypothetical probabilities of 
success. Suppose that the federal courts in our hypothetical jurisdiction 
will decide 200 similar cases in a year.143 Assume that in every one of 
these cases, irreparable harm will occur if an injunction is not granted and 
the balance of harms favors an injunction, as does the public interest. In 
half of those cases, one party seeks a preliminary injunction. Assume that 
the probability of success on the merits for each set of 100 cases is 40% at 
the outset. So for the 100 cases where a preliminary injunction is not 
sought, ultimately the plaintiff prevails in 40 of the cases. If the other 100 
cases have the same probability, then 40 of those should also succeed, 
unless lock-in biases the outcome. 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See Samual Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113 (1990) (noting that few attain the ideals of ignoring sunk costs 
and focusing only on the prospective benefits and costs of alternative courses of action). 
 143. Of course, in the vast majority of cases, courts do not actually decide the merits. Only a 
tiny fraction of cases are resolved at trial. Summary judgment may also be seen as a decision on the 
merits, for those cases where there are no relevant factual disputes. Many other cases may settle, 
however, or they may be dismissed by the court or the parties. 
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How are judges to assess the likelihood of success in those cases where 
plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction? If the judge has no further 
information other than the success rate of plaintiffs in other cases, then the 
judge will determine that the plaintiff’s chance of success is 40%. If this 
jurisdiction requires a 51% likelihood of success, then the judge will deny 
the preliminary injunction. This will occur regardless of any irreparable 
harm to the plaintiff, and even if the balance of harms would strongly favor 
an injunction. So then once those irreparable harms occur, and the judge is 
then asked to revisit the merits, will 40 of the cases succeed? Or will some 
of the cases now lose, particularly the close ones where the facts 
supporting the claim are more marginal. Perhaps only 35 cases will prevail. 
Or 30. Or 25. The number would vary according to the strength of any 
lock-in effect. 
 





No PI sought 100 0 40 40 
PI sought, 
Winter test 
100 100 30 38 
PI sought, 
sliding scale
100 0 40 40 
 
Perhaps the previous example was too simplistic, because the judge and 
the parties do know something about the strength of the case at the 
preliminary stage. So let’s assume that 50 of the cases are “clear” cases, 
and we know that in 20 of them the plaintiff will win and in the other 30 
the plaintiff will lose.144 That would still leave 50 cases where the outcome 
is not clear at the outset. Absent any information that the plaintiff’s chance 
of success is greater than the average success rate of 40%, the judge will 
deny a preliminary injunction for those cases. Absent any preliminary 
injunction proceedings, the plaintiff should prevail in 20 of those 50 
“close” cases. However, if the lock-in effect biases the outcome of those 
cases, perhaps the plaintiff will only prevail in 15 instead of 20 cases. 
Again, the precise number will depend on the strength of the lock-in effect. 
This situation would come out differently if the plaintiff does not have 
to show that he is 51% likely to succeed on the merits. If a 40% chance of 
success would meet the “serious questions” test, then judges, absent further 
information beyond the average 40% rate of success, would always issue a 
                                                                                                                     
 144. In theory one would expect the parties to settle in “clear” cases, although in practice many 
cases that may seem clear to a judge would not seem clear to the parties. See Wistrich & Rachlinski, 
supra note 44, at 593. For the purposes of this Article, one can simply consider the final outcome of 
the case without becoming concerned over the precise means of resolution. 
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preliminary injunction and irreparable harm would be avoided.145 The 
status quo would be preserved long enough for the judge to decide the 
merits of the claim.  
 








No PI sought 100 0 40 40 
PI sought, Winter test, 
easy case 
50 30 20 20 
PI sought, Winter test, 
close case 
50 50 15 19 
PI sought, Winter test, 
all cases 
100 80 35 39 
PI sought, sliding scale, 
easy case 
50 30 20 20 
PI sought, sliding scale, 
close case 
50 0 20 20 
PI sought, sliding scale, 
all cases 
100 50 40 40 
 
The precise impact of the lock-in effect will likely depend on numerous 
factors, and quantification of the effect will require more detailed study of 
existing court data or new experiments using judges. However, imposing 
relatively high standards for success on the merits creates the conditions 
for lock-in to occur, and it can be expected to occur as a result. 
B.  Proposed Solutions 
If one assumes that lock-in occurs in practice, at least in some cases, 
then this Article argues that this systematic bias against plaintiffs who seek 
and lose preliminary injunctions creates an injustice in our legal system. As 
a result, steps should be taken to reform the preliminary injunction 
standards applied in federal court. The lock-in effect justifies a uniform 
standard for preliminary injunctions and provides some insight into what 
the uniform standard should be. 
The best approach for reducing the risk of lock-in is simply to remove 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Under this hypothetical, a preliminary injunction would always issue in the close or 
uncertain cases. This is because we are assuming that irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and 
the public interest all favor an injunction. While there will be some preliminary injunctions that are 
later vacated after the merits are decided, these do not pose a risk of lock-in themselves because the 
judge does not have to justify the harm to the defendant, which was outweighed by the risk of harm 
to the plaintiff. Part IV discusses in more detail the issue of the asymmetry of the lock-in effect on 
preliminary injunctions. 
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the conditions that create it. Put another way, lock-in can be largely 
avoided if the standard for likelihood of success on the merits is set 
appropriately, at a low level. Part of the problem with some of the existing 
standards for evaluating preliminary injunctions is that they ask the same 
question of the merits as would be decided at a full blown trial—whether 
the plaintiff is more likely than not correct. Therefore, judges in 
jurisdictions that do not employ a sliding scale or balancing test are asked 
to decide the same question twice, only the first time they do not have all 
of the relevant evidence, the protections of trial procedures, or sufficient 
time to reach a deliberative decision. If the initial decision were reliable, 
then lock-in would not create a concern. But because the initial decision 
has such great potential to be wrong, there is a risk that the first decision 
will lock-in the judge to some degree, so that some claims that should 
prevail on the merits do not. 
This is not to say that the likelihood of success on the merits should be 
ignored entirely. Rather, the best approach is one already identified by 
several circuits—a sliding scale. So long as a case raises “serious 
questions” on the merits, then a preliminary injunction should issue so long 
as the risk of irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued outweighs any 
harm that would be caused by an injunction. Harm from an injunction that 
can be addressed through a bond need not factor into the balancing, 
although any irreparable harm to the defendant must always be balanced.146 
The “serious questions” test will help to weed out claims that have no 
merit (which can also be addressed through motions to dismiss)147 or 
marginal claims. Balancing will ensure that preliminary injunctions are not 
issued excessively or in cases where the public interest or the harm to the 
defendant would be too serious. This approach would greatly reduce the 
risk of lock-in compared to those jurisdictions that require a showing that 
plaintiff is “likely to succeed on the merits” or a “likelihood of success on 
the merits.”148 This approach would also reduce the uncertainty149 of 
                                                                                                                     
 146. E.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 814 (1929); SMC Corp., Ltd. v. Lockjaw, 
LLC, 481 F. Supp. 2d 918, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2007). By definition, any harm that might be addressed 
through a bond would not be irreparable, because money would in theory compensate any party 
harmed by the issuance of an injunction. However, courts often will weigh monetary or other 
compensable harms against irreparable harm when balancing the harms under the preliminary 
injunction standard. 
 147. One open question is the relationship between the “serious questions” standard for a 
preliminary injunction and the heightened “plausibility” standard for pleading used to decide 
motions to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952–54 (2009). Although the movant on a 
preliminary injunction has the opportunity to present additional evidence beyond the complaint, 
discovery may not have occurred yet, and so the difference between the two standards may not be 
much, if any. 
 148. There does not appear to be any court decision explaining what a “strong” showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits entails, but if it requires greater than 51% probability, then the 
test for a preliminary injunction is oddly higher than the ultimate burden of proof. 
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precisely what likelihood of success the plaintiff must show—it must be 
enough, when weighed against the irreparable harm, to outweigh any harm 
to the defendant from an injunction. 
C.  Need for Further Study 
In many ways, the question of whether lock-in affects preliminary 
injunctions demands empirical research. Certainly empirical studies could 
test whether this bias exists in practice, as this Article argues can be 
expected. Such study might involve hypothetical cases that can be 
manipulated to control for all the variables that might lead to lock-in. A 
natural experiment also might be identified where the decision to seek a 
preliminary injunction is random, and not based on any assessment by the 
parties of the strength of their case. The study could then test whether the 
differences in the preliminary injunction standard (the likelihood of success 
on the merits prong) affect the ultimate outcome of the cases. If lock-in 
occurs, as this Article argues, then the lock-in effect should be stronger in 
jurisdictions that require a plaintiff to demonstrate a 51% chance of 
success on the merits. Jurisdictions that employ a sliding-scale or 
balancing approach should have a much weaker lock-in effect, if any. The 
Fourth Circuit might provide an interesting test case because of the recent 
change there in preliminary injunction standards. Based on the analysis of 
this Article, parties who seek a preliminary injunction should prevail in the 
Fourth Circuit at a lower rate after Winter than they did before.150 
This Article located only one empirical study—the Justice on the Fly 
study—that comes close to addressing the topic of lock-in. Professors 
Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan, and Rebecca Gill gathered data on stays of 
removal in immigration cases following the Supreme Court decision in 
Nken v. Holder, which announced as the applicable standard essentially the 
same preliminary injunction standard announced in Winter.151 This study 
can potentially shed light on whether lock-in occurs in these cases. To test 
whether lock-in occurs, one would want to know (1) that the choice to seek 
a stay of removal was random—unrelated to the strength of the underlying 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Of course there would still be some level of uncertainty inherent in this process, but given 
the preliminary nature of the determination, it is not feasible to ever completely remove uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is simply a part of litigation that all parties and their lawyers must deal with. 
 150. E.g., Jonah M. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Accessing the Effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012); Jonah M. Gelbach, 
Selection in Motion: A Formal Model of Rule 12(b)(6) and the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading 
Policy (Aug. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.  
cfm?abstract_id=2138428; Of course selection effects may also be present, making this analysis 
difficult. For example, parties may be less likely to seek a preliminary injunction in the Fourth 
Circuit under the heightened standard because they are less confident they can show that they are 
likely to succeed on the merits. 
 151. Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan & Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant 
Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (draft on file with author). 
33
Lynch: The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
812 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
appeal—and (2) that the granting or denial of a stay of removal was related 
to the underlying strength of the appeal. When the authors of this study 
compared the grant rate for petitions among people who never asked for 
stays to those for people who sought a stay but were denied, they did not 
find a significant difference. Thus, this study does not provide evidence 
that the lock-in effect occurs in those cases. 
The Justice on the Fly study does not, however, prove the opposite, that 
lock-in does not occur, at least not for preliminary injunctions at the 
district court level. First, the sample size of the study is necessarily small 
due to the short amount of time that has passed since the Nken decision, 
particularly given the relatively low success rate of the cases studied.152 
Second, the study does not examine whether lock-in is greater in 
jurisdictions with a higher standard for granting the stay. Third, the lock-in 
effect may be present to a lesser extent, or not at all, at the circuit court 
level where cases are decided by a panel of three judges, instead of a single 
judge. Fourth, the framing of the question could be improved to better test 
the issue. The Justice on the Fly study was not designed to test lock-in but 
rather to assess the correlation between grants of a stay and the ultimate 
success of the petition. One aspect of this issue clearly apparent from the 
Justice on the Fly study is that these issues are complicated and difficult to 
tease apart. The study found large variation among the circuits in terms of 
the rate at which stays were granted, as well as the “error” rate in terms of 
the match between granting or denying stays and the ultimate resolution of 
the petition. Given the importance of this issue, and the scarcity of 
empirical data, further study would help to assess whether lock-in occurs 
on preliminary injunctions, to what extent it biases outcomes, if at all, and 
what impact those findings would have on the appropriate standard for 
deciding preliminary injunctions. 
IV.  RESPONSES TO COMMON CONCERNS 
Many alternative explanations or reasons to reject the premise of this 
Article may come to mind. The next section addresses some of the key 
concerns that have been raised on this issue, and ultimately concludes that 
the basic premise of this Article is sound—lock-in can be expected to 
occur when judges decide preliminary injunctions, and the best way to 
avoid that lock-in is by reducing the conditions that lead to lock-in. 
A.  There Is No “There” There 
Perhaps at this point the reader is not convinced that lock-in occurs. 
After all, judges change their minds all the time. With further time to 
                                                                                                                     
 152. For example, out of 934 cases in the study where a stay of removal was requested, only 
eighty-four of the petitions were ultimately granted. Among those, the stay was denied in forty-one 
of the cases. 
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reflect on a problem, or especially with additional evidence, judges can and 
do change their initial opinions on the merits of a claim. This Article has 
not pointed out any instance of a judge saying that he would not change his 
initial decision on the merits because he did not want the irreparable harm 
that occurred to have been a waste. Given that reality, is there any hard 
data to back up the assertion that lock-in exists?  
As an initial matter, of course the judicial process can result in 
reconsideration of preliminary assessments of the merits. Judges grant 
motions for reconsideration, after all. Trial judges also will reconsider 
earlier decisions when appellate courts overturn parts of those decisions. A 
judge who denies a motion to dismiss might ultimately dismiss the case on 
the merits. And even in the preliminary injunction context, judges who 
deny injunctions based on insufficient likelihood of success on the merits 
do sometimes nevertheless rule in favor of the plaintiff after a trial. The 
point of lock-in is not that judges never change their minds; it is much 
more modest. This Article’s argument regarding lock-in is that judges are 
less likely to change their minds, and that this difference will systemically 
bias outcomes against parties who unsuccessfully seek a preliminary 
injunction. 
Furthermore, because the lock-in effect is a cognitive bias, judges will 
not explicitly state that they are being biased in their decisions, and they 
may not even be aware it is occurring. Because the effect results in 
unintentional bias, it will not be directly reflected in any one opinion. It can 
only be detected after a systematic review of a sufficiently large and 
sufficiently similar set of cases so that small but significant effects can be 
discerned. 
This Article also does not purport to have direct evidence of lock-in on 
preliminary injunctions occurring in practice. The thrust of this Article is 
ultimately a modest one. Based on insights from the psychology and 
economics literature, and a consideration of the circumstances when a 
judge denies a preliminary injunction solely for failure to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success, the conditions are ripe for lock-in to occur. Because 
lock-in has been observed in other similar situations, there is no reason to 
believe that judges deciding preliminary injunctions under existing 
standards will not be similarly biased. Of course this instantiation of the 
lock-in effect will not be proven until more detailed study occurs, but such 
study is outside the scope of this Article. 
B.  Other Solutions 
Even if the reader is persuaded that lock-in is likely to occur, one might 
object to the proposed solution. This Article’s solution is a modest one in 
that it simply suggests that an existing standard employed by a number of 
different circuits should be applied more uniformly. It is less drastic than a 
solution others have proposed—eliminating consideration of the merits 
35
Lynch: The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
814 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
altogether at the preliminary injunction stage. Nevertheless, the following 
subsections address the two main alternative proposals that can be seen as 
less dramatic steps to reduce or avoid lock-in: (1) requiring separate 
decision makers to decide the merits if one has already decided a 
preliminary injunction; or (2) increasing awareness of the potential for 
lock-in and training to de-bias judges and protect against lock-in. 
1.  Separate Decision Makers 
One seemingly obvious solution would be to have different judges 
decide preliminary injunctions and final determinations on the merits. By 
separating out the preliminary decision from the ultimate resolution of the 
case, one might expect to reduce most or all of any lock-in effect that 
occurs. However, given the recent experiments identifying “vicarious 
entrapment,”153 an alternative solution is preferable. Judges may readily be 
expected to exhibit many “psychological connections” that would make 
separating preliminary from final determinations on the merits an 
insufficient remedy. Judges belong to their own group and might be readily 
expected to exhibit collegiality to other members of their court. Judges will 
have an easy time seeing a case from the perspective of another judge, and 
may not want to make a colleague look bad. Additionally some judges will 
share additional attributes, such as their alma mater, political party, prior 
work experience, etc. Any of these seems a more powerful basis for a 
psychological connection than the shared birthday found to cause vicarious 
lock-in in experiments.154 Additionally, even if judges are aware of the 
potential for lock-in, that awareness does not mean it can be avoided, just 
as economics students who extensively studied economic irrationality did 
not avoid the vicarious entrapment.155 
In some cases, there is another way to separate the initial decision 
maker from the ultimate decision maker—the jury. In these cases, the 
judge might make initial determinations on the preliminary injunction, but 
the jury would ultimately decide the case. The jury and the judge should be 
sufficiently psychologically separate to avoid vicarious lock-in, and 
regardless of the level of psychological separation, the jury would not even 
know of the prior decision (unless a very savvy juror could deduce that the 
judge was likely to have denied a preliminary injunction). 
This Article concedes that in jury trials, the risk for lock-in should be 
expected to be less than in bench trials. However, relying on the jury to 
reach an independent decision is not a perfect solution for several reasons. 
Initially, the relative proportion of civil cases that go to a jury trial is 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Gunia et al., supra note 12 (discussing four experiments that explored the concept of 
vicarious entrapment). 
 154. Id. at 1241–42.  
 155. Id. at 1242. 
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incredibly small.156 The same judge who decides a preliminary injunction 
might later dismiss the case on a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. 
Additionally, the expense of continuing to a jury trial might be enough to 
cause settlement in a way that is unfavorable to a plaintiff compared to a 
settlement that might have been reached if a preliminary injunction had 
issued.157 Moreover, a judge would still exert some control over the 
ultimate decision at trial—through jury instructions, legal rulings, or even 
evidentiary rulings—that might constrain the jury’s ability to decide fairly, 
or increase the likelihood that the jury would return a verdict that 
vindicates the judge’s earlier ruling on the preliminary injunction.158 Thus, 
relying on the jury would likely not eliminate the negative impact that 
lock-in has in this context, at least not entirely. 
2.  Cognitive De-biasing 
Another potential solution is to make judges aware of the risk of lock-in 
and to provide them with feedback on their errors so they can avoid them 
in the future. The term for this type of approach is “cognitive de-
biasing.”159 Unfortunately, attempts at de-biasing have been met with 
limited success.160 Although recent research into de-biasing may prove 
more successful, simply avoiding the conditions of lock-in is a better 
approach. 
                                                                                                                     
 156.  U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Action Taken, U.S. COURTS (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2012/Table410.pdf (indicating 
that in 2012, of 271,385 federal civil cases filed, only 1.2% reached trial). 
 157. One might object that the granting of a preliminary injunction would cause some 
defendants to settle, but as discussed infra Section IV.C, the concern about the risk of lock-in is not 
symmetrical, and therefore it is appropriate to focus on the denial of preliminary injunctions, 
because of the motivational effects caused by allowing irreparable harm to occur and because of the 
informational imbalances that often exist early in a case. 
 158. Again, this need not be intentional, and having a case submitted to a jury would be 
expected to reduce the lock-in effect to some degree. However, even if a judge is not intentionally 
attempting to constrain the jury, the subtle effects of lock-in can still influence judicial decision-
making in a way that is systematically biased against plaintiffs who seek but fail to obtain a 
preliminary injunction. 
An example of how the judge can still affect the outcome of a trial despite the findings of the 
jury can be seen in the patent dispute between Apple and Samsung. In that case, the district court 
judge, Lucy Koh, recently overturned the jury’s damage award, cutting it nearly in half and ordering 
a retrial. See Ian Sherr, U.S. Judge Reduces Apple’s Patent Award in Samsung Case, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873234783045783345405411007 
44.html. Given the variety of ways in which the judge still influences the outcome on the merits in a 
jury trial, lock-in can still be expected to occur. The judge might interpret factual findings of the 
jury in a different light to justify her earlier ruling, for example. She also might limit evidence that 
goes before the jury that would affect the outcome of the case. 
 159. See Katherine L. Milkman, Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman, How Can Decision 
Making Be Improved? 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-102, 2008), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/08-102.pdf. 
 160. See Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 422, 428 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, eds. 1982). 
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De-biasing is most important in those situations where the conflict or 
source of the bias is unavoidable. In the classic business investment 
example, it is difficult if not impossible to avoid the sequential decisions 
where sometimes the earlier decision will be shown to be incorrect. In 
those situations, the best solution was to help the initial decision maker 
think through all the possible outcomes, including a negative result on the 
investment. That approach is similar to this Article’s proposal for 
preliminary injunctions. If judges look merely for “serious questions” as to 
the merits, they are recognizing that not all of those cases will succeed on 
the merits although some of them will. Furthermore, this standard allows 
judges to appreciate that it is often impossible to accurately identify at the 
preliminary stage which claims will succeed on the merits and which will 
not. Thus, using a “serious question” standard for preliminary injunctions 
is the solution most consistent with existing literature on cognitive biases. 
An additional benefit of this proposal is that it can be implemented 
relatively easily. Circuits that don’t currently employ a sliding-scale test 
could adopt one. Or the Supreme Court could consider this issue in more 
detail than it had done in Winter and its companion decisions, and hold that 
the sliding-scale test should be applied for all preliminary injunctions. 
Although there would be some learning curve for judges when applying a 
different standard, there would be no administrative burden of reassigning 
cases after a preliminary injunction was decided. Additionally there would 
be no burden in terms of educating judges about the lock-in effect and 
providing them sufficient feedback and individual training for de-biasing 
to be effective. Therefore, uniform adoption of the sliding-scale test for 
preliminary injunctions is the best solution to address the risk of lock-in. 
C.  Asymmetry 
One natural question is whether lock-in cuts both ways in this context, 
such that any biases might balance themselves out. While this possibility 
seems reasonable at first glance, the structure of the preliminary injunction 
test leads to a one-sided bias for lock-in when preliminary injunctions are 
denied. As in most situations in life, but particularly those involving 
cognitive biases, context is key.161 For preliminary injunctions, the context 
is more than simply an initial assessment on the merits followed by a later 
decision on the merits. Although there is some consistency motivation any 
time a preliminary injunction is decided, the self-justification motives are 
present in only a limited subset of preliminary injunctions—those where 
irreparable harm to the movant outweighs any harm from the injunction. 
For a preliminary injunction to be granted, the judge must explicitly find 
that irreparable harm would otherwise occur and that any harm from the 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Korobkin, supra note 85, at 1235 (noting that despite the broad range of contexts in 
which the endowment effect has been observed, “it is not universally apparent nor equally striking 
across contexts”). 
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injunction is outweighed. 162 Thus, granting a preliminary injunction does 
not create the same motivation in the judge to justify allowing some 
irreparable harm to occur.163 When a preliminary injunction is granted, it 
merely preserves the status quo long enough for a decision to be reached 
on the merits, and it is not granted where preserving the status quo causes 
more harm than not doing so. 
Additionally, in many cases courts will require plaintiffs seeking a 
preliminary injunction to post a bond to cover any damage to the defendant 
as a result of the injunction, further reducing the likelihood that lock-in 
will occur when a preliminary injunction is granted. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to focus on reducing the lock-in effect that occurs when a 
preliminary injunction is denied without too much concern for lock-in that 
cuts the opposite direction. 
D.  Scope 
If this Article has succeeded in convincing the reader that lock-in is a 
concern for preliminary injunctions, one may ask, why stop there? Do 
other legal standards pose the threat of lock-in? The short answer to that 
question is “yes.” Lock-in likely affects more areas of the law than just 
preliminary injunctions. Other tests that require a preliminary assessment 
of the merits to be weighed against some irreparable costs come to mind, 
such as discovery stays or injunctions pending appeal. The potential for 
lock-in in those areas should be further explored. However, there are good 
reasons for starting with preliminary injunctions. 
First, the standard for issuing preliminary injunctions is currently 
uncertain. The Supreme Court has called into question the appropriate 
standard for preliminary injunctions through Winter164 and its companion 
cases, Nken165 and Munaf.166 Lower courts continue to grapple with 
whether to adopt the broad and rigid test from Winter or to retain the 
                                                                                                                     
 162. This factor may not be as important in those cases where irreparable harm and likelihood 
of success on the merits are tightly linked. In some cases, such as trade secrets cases, any irreparable 
harm can only result if the claim has sufficient merit. In other types of claims, such as 
environmental challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (e.g., Winter), the harm is 
distinct from the merits and so they may diverge. 
 163. Even if lock-in can occur when a preliminary injunction is granted, it will be a much 
weaker effect than the lock-in that results when a preliminary injunction is denied solely based on 
likelihood of success on the merits. If there the irreparable harm from granting an injunction 
outweighs the irreparable harm from denying an injunction, the injunction will be denied regardless 
of the judge’s assessment of the merits. Thus, denial of preliminary injunctions are the primary, and 
perhaps the only, situation where a judge will allow irreparable harm to occur because of the 
preliminary assessment of the merits. Additionally, in general, defendants do not face the same 
information asymmetries that plaintiffs face at the early stages of litigation and are more able to 
produce evidence that will show they are likely to succeed before discovery has been completed. 
 164. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374–75 (2008). 
 165. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760–61, 1766 (2009). 
 166. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008). 
39
Lynch: The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
818 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
flexibility of the standards they have developed over the previous decades. 
This makes lock-in on preliminary injunctions particularly timely, since 
lower courts or even the Supreme Court might have cause to reconsider the 
issue in the near future. 
Second, courts often discuss preliminary injunctions as an 
“extraordinary remedy,”167 even though they simply preserve the status 
quo. Thus, denials of preliminary injunctions can be justified even in closer 
cases on that ground. In contrast, while discovery stays are not granted 
routinely and require a demonstration of good cause,168 discovery would 
normally proceed absent a stay, and so in that situation the court is being 
asked to prevent the status quo from occurring. Additionally, a discovery 
stay may still be granted even if there is strong likelihood of success, where 
the risks of unnecessary discovery outweigh the harms of delay.169 Thus, 
there is not the same inclination for judges to find that the plaintiff does 
not have a likelihood of success when deciding discovery stays.170 
Third, a preliminary injunction is typically decided early in the life of a 
case and under significant time pressure. Thus, preliminary injunctions can 
be expected to have a greater error rate than other situations where lock-in 
might occur, such as on motions for reconsideration or motions for 
injunctions pending appeal. Empirical data would be helpful to test this 
claim as well. If preliminary injunctions are demonstrated to contain more 
errors than later decisions on the merits, that would provide additional 
support in the call to address any potential lock-in to those error-laden 
decisions. However, the unique context of preliminary injunctions, which 
often occur before discovery has been completed and without the benefit of 
more rigorous trial procedures for validating evidence, provides ample 
justification to conclude that the assessment of the merits at the 
preliminary injunction stage is susceptible to greater error than later 
determinations. 
Fourth, preliminary injunctions pose a greater risk of lock-in because 
the standard that many circuits apply to assess the merits, such as “likely to 
succeed on the merits” or a “strong showing on the merits” is functionally 
the same as the ultimate burden of proof on a plaintiff in civil litigation. At 
other stages where the judge is asked to make a preliminary assessment of 
the merits, specifically on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary 
judgment, the standard imposed is quite different.  
                                                                                                                     
 167. See, e.g., Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375–76. 
 168. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denver Water Bd., No. 08-cv-01984-MSK-MEH, 2008 WL 
5233787, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2008) (“Generally, it is the policy in this district not to stay 
discovery pending a ruling on motions to dismiss.” (citing Ruampant v. Moynihan, No. 06-cv-
00955-WDM-BNB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57304, at *4–5 (D. Colo. Aug. 11, 2006))). 
 169. Lynch, supra note 89, at 88 (discussing the weighing of harms from delay and harms from 
unnecessary discovery based on a “preliminary peek” at the merits). 
 170. Id. at 101. 
40
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/5
2014] THE LOCK-IN EFFECT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 819 
 
For motions to dismiss, the court looks not to whether the plaintiff is 
likely to succeed, but rather to whether the complaint contains sufficient 
facts that, if taken as true, would state a plausible claim for relief.171 
Summary judgment is granted when there is “no genuine issue as to any 
material fact” and an essential element of the claim is missing after 
sufficient time for discovery.172 Both of these tests explicitly acknowledge 
that the evidence may differ at a trial on the merits and require that the 
facts in the complaint or evidence on summary judgment be construed in a 
light favorable to the non-movant. For preliminary injunctions, in contrast, 
the movant is not seeking to end the case, but simply to preserve the status 
quo until the issues can be resolved on the merits at trial. Thus, the 
conditions are sufficiently different in the Rule 12(b) and Rule 56 contexts 
that lock-in does not present as great a concern. 
Fifth, injunctions pending appeal are sufficiently different in that 
appellate judges likely do not exhibit the psychological connectedness that 
would result in vicarious lock-in at the trial court level.173 Appellate judges 
are familiar with reviewing trial court decisions for error, and they would 
not be expected to face the same self-justification pressures as the judge 
who initially decided the merits. 
Finally, a long time often elapses between a decision on a preliminary 
injunction and a decision on the merits. This time is much longer than 
would occur on a motion for reconsideration, for example, which asks the 
judge to reevaluate a recent decision in light of some overlooked 
information. Although the length of time might mean that the judge has the 
opportunity to come to the issue with a fresh perspective,174 there is still 
significant pressure for the judge to issue a decision on the merits that 
conforms to the earlier decision.175 Furthermore, the length of time that has 
passed does have a different effect on the conditions that give rise to lock-
in: more time between decisions means more time for irreparable harm to 
occur. Thus, a judge deciding a motion for reconsideration is unlikely to be 
faced with a situation where some extensive irreparable harm has occurred 
in the relatively short time since the initial decision being revisited. 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 172. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 173. Evidence of the “affirmance effect” somewhat undercuts this point, as appellate judges 
likely are to some degree influenced by the lower court’s decision. See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. 
George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 359–63 (2005). Additionally, sometimes 
appellate court panels reviewing a lower court ruling on a preliminary injunction go beyond the 
“likelihood of success” question to instead address the merits, thus creating case law with binding 
precedential effect on further proceedings. See, e.g., Minard Run Oil. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 
12-4160, 2013 WL 5357066 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2013). 
 174. Judges often have enormous case loads, and so they do not remember all the details of a 
preliminary injunction motion they may have decided months or even years previously. 
 175. Conforming to an earlier assessment of the merits also saves time, which is important for 
federal judges who often have very large caseloads. 
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E.  Extraordinary Remedy 
A final important objection to this Article’s proposal is that it will lead 
to more preliminary injunctions, which is not necessarily a good outcome. 
However, more preliminary injunctions would help preserve the integrity 
of the judicial process by avoiding the choice “between justice on the fly or 
participation in what may be an ‘idle ceremony.’”176 Furthermore, the 
proposal is a modest one that does not lead to preliminary injunctions 
being granted as a matter of course. Rather, preliminary injunctions will 
only be granted when all four factors, when considered together, justify the 
injunction. An injunction may issue when there are only “serious 
questions” as to the merits, but not necessarily so. If there is a relatively 
small chance of irreparable harm, this may not be enough when combined 
with the small chance of success. Even if the likelihood of irreparable harm 
is high, “serious questions” on the merits may not be enough when the 
harm caused by the injunction would outweigh the harms from denying the 
injunction. 
An additional aspect of this problem is the composition of the parties. 
The prototypical example of a righteous plaintiff seeking to enjoin the 
unlawful conduct of some nefarious defendant breaks down in many 
situations. In many, if not most, cases the defendant is simply seeking to 
proceed in a lawful manner to pursue her own interests while also 
benefiting society as a whole. And in some cases, a plaintiff might be the 
one whose claims would harm the public interest, or who is using the 
litigation process to extort some gains from a defendant who would rather 
settle than engage in extensive litigation to vindicate his rights. But these 
types of litigants are still addressed under this proposal, which simply 
provides judges with the flexibility to use their equity power to ensure that 
potentially meritorious claims have their day in court. Frivolous lawsuits 
are not the cases where a preliminary injunction will occur. And if the 
balance of harms or the public interest supports denial of a preliminary 
injunction, then it will not issue. Therefore, while the modest proposal of 
uniformly applying the existing sliding-scale approach would likely lead to 
an increase in preliminary injunctions, it would do so on a limited scale 
that best serves the equitable interests in each case and avoids the injustice 
of creating a significant bias against plaintiffs who have been denied a 
preliminary injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential for lock-in to occur in preliminary injunctions provides 
justification for calls for greater uniformity among the standards for 
preliminary injunctions. Additionally, it provides justification for what 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009) (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. 
FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 10 (1942)). 
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should be required to meet the “likelihood of success on the merits” prong. 
That showing need not be a high one, as serious questions should be 
sufficient for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. All of the circuits, or 
the Supreme Court itself, should adopt a balancing approach to preliminary 
injunctions that requires, at minimum, only a showing of serious questions 
as to the merits of the case. This approach will preserve the functions of a 
preliminary injunction—to allow for considered decision-making, to avoid 
“justice on the fly,” and to preserve the status quo until legal claims can be 
resolved. Additionally, this approach will avoid the conditions for lock-in 
and remove a potential source of systemic bias from the judicial system.  
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